India Nuclear Deal Might Face Early Vote in U.S. Congress

    Why is the Administrative Branch of the United States negotiating a nuclear pact with India?  There is no practical benefit. In fact it would be very costly and uncertain for the U.S. to supply India with Uranium Fuel. As for the promise of "technology,," they have been doing fine for a long time. Security cannot be the reason. That horse left the barn long ago. They have the bombs, the intercontinental missiles and the nuclear submarines. The pact actually exempts them from any inspections or control of their military reactors or nuclear weapons systems  To stop nuclear proliferation? No, the pact would give them free reign to export their nuclear technology and supplies

   What does our administration have in mind?  It sounds like we are buying political and military comittment on the Asian Continent i.e., India as a counterweight to our ultimate rival China. If you want to see how this is being pushed through Congress, read Elaine Grossman's article.  

By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The White House might push international regulatory bodies to hasten their reviews of a proposed U.S. nuclear energy deal with India, issue experts said last week (see GSN, Dec. 10).

An effort to deliver the agreement to the U.S. Congress as early as March would underscore President George W. Bush’s bid to see the deal approved before leaving office in January 2009, officials and observers say.

The bilateral accord, finalized in July, would allow New Delhi to buy U.S. nuclear materials and technology in exchange for submitting the South Asian nation’s civilian nuclear facilities to international safeguards and inspections (see GSN, July 24).

Along with its Indian partners, the United States is taking steps toward implementation despite ongoing political opposition in New Delhi that might yet force the deal’s demise.  Sharp criticism has been leveled from both the political left and right.  Most ominously for the pact’s viability, Indian communists have threatened to end their support for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s coalition government and force elections if the deal goes forward (see GSN, Dec. 12).

If the so-called “123 agreement” is not enacted, a future U.S. president would be less likely to pursue it in its current form, according to pundits.  Some U.S. lawmakers have voiced concern that the deal weakens global nonproliferation regimes, while others have cited worries that the pact turns a blind eye to India’s friendly relations with Iran (see GSN, Nov. 12 and Oct. 5).

Before the agreement can go to Capitol Hill for a vote authorizing implementation, India must first negotiate a safeguards protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Additionally, the Nuclear Suppliers Group would have to exempt New Delhi from its guidelines banning the export of key nuclear technologies or materials to nations that have not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or do not allow international monitoring of all their nuclear facilities.

Barring any schedule changes, the deal is on track for congressional debate next summer, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior associate Sharon Squassoni said last Friday at a panel discussion on Capitol Hill. 

Under existing time lines, a safeguards arrangement — currently the focus of Indian and IAEA negotiations — could be approved at the U.N. watchdog’s next board meeting in early March.  The U.S.-Indian deal would proceed to the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group later in the spring before making its way to Capitol Hill in the summer, she said.

Many observers believe the administration hopes to land congressional approval before the 2008 presidential campaign switches into high gear.  As it stands, this timing is somewhat tight, Squassoni said. 

However, the Bush administration might move to put the accord on an even faster track, which could have U.S. lawmakers debating implementation legislation by March, Squassoni and other deal-watchers said.

One congressional staffer attending last week’s event, which was sponsored by the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei might reach a nuclear safeguards agreement within the coming weeks.  Once an accord is struck, the White House would probably request an emergency meeting of the IAEA governors to approve it, perhaps even before the end of January, the aide said.

The Bush administration might take a similar tack at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, pushing to gather in advance of a consultative group meeting slated for March and a plenary session slated for May, the aide said.  A hastened process might start as soon as early February.

“On a very optimistic fast track, we could have this agreement before us by as early as … March,” the congressional official said.  “That’s very optimistic, particularly given the way events have gone on everything related to this negotiation so far.  There have been nothing but roadblocks.”

The staff member spoke during a question-and-answer session on condition of not being named publicly.

Squassoni and fellow panelist Henry Sokolski, who heads the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, agreed that the White House would likely press the international organizations to act swiftly.  That said, Squassoni noted, any such administration effort might get tripped up if even one of the IAEA board’s 35 nations requests a delay.

Few U.S. lawmakers are actively tracking the issue, Sokolski said.  Many erroneously believe that a prior vote in Congress constituted all the approval necessary for Washington’s agreement with New Delhi to proceed, he said. 

In fact, the Hyde Act, which lawmakers passed in January 2006, enacted limits on just the outlines of the deal Bush negotiated with Singh.  Another vote to approve the trade agreement itself would be required following action by the two international regulatory bodies.

To ensure that the IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers Group reflect U.S. congressional priorities for the accord, lawmakers should speak out about the importance of the Hyde Act’s nonproliferation provisions, Sokolski urged.

For example, the United States should insist that India submit its nuclear facilities to international controls into perpetuity, and in so doing, reject a number of loopholes Delhi is seeking that would allow it to suspend inspections under certain conditions, he said.  Lawmakers might also urge the Nuclear Suppliers Group to grant an exception for India only so long as the nation maintains its existing moratorium on nuclear testing, he said.

Sokolski was pessimistic, though, that Congress would be adequately prepared for a vote if the administration submits the pact for early approval.

underground nuclear test site.

Most recent  official Indian Policy statement:

Despite promoting a test ban treaty for decades, India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on September 10, 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister Gujral reiterated India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests.